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Statement of the Case. 
The parties at trial are like the teams in a pro football game. The jury is like the on-field 
officiating crew. At the end of the trial, the jury makes a decision-like the officiating crew 
makes a ruling on the field. If either team disputes the decision, they throw the red "challenge" 
flag and ask for a review by a separate reviewing official. Likewise, if a party disagrees with the 
verdict, they file motions and ask the trial court for a similar review. 
When presented with a challenge, the reviewing official must review the play and rule 
either the play stands or reverse the call on the field, based on his independent assessment. The 
reviewing official cannot defer to the officiating crew on the field and refuse to review the play. 
The trial judge has a similar role and is required to make an independent evaluation of the 
credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence. As it would be error for the reviewing 
official to defer to the officiating crew and refuse to independently review the play, it is error 
when a trial court defers to the jury and declines to provide an independent evaluation of the 
credibility of the witnesses or weigh the evidence. 
(i) A statement of the case. 
The Appellant, Donetta Kafader appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for additur 
or in the alternative new trial filed following a personal injury jury trial in July 2011. 
(ii) The course of the proceedings in the trial and its disposition. 
Mrs. Kafader was injured in a rear-end collision in Kimberly, Idaho on October 20,2008. 
During discovery, Mrs. Kafader signed a medical release form that provided the Defendant's 
counsel with complete access to Mrs. Kafader's medical records. 
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At trial, the Defendant admitted liability but denied responsibility for Mrs. Kafader's 
injuries. Mrs. Kafader presented her two treating physicians; Dr. Richard Hammond, a 
neurologist, and Dr. Brad Turner, a chiropractor, who testified they believed, after having treated 
Mrs. Kafader for over two years, that the cervical inj ury Mrs. Kafader sustained in this collision 
was permanent. The Defendant presented video testimony of Dr. Richard Knoebel because Dr. 
Knoebel refused to attend the trial. Mrs. Kafader then presented Dr. Hammond to rebut Dr. 
Knoebel's opinions. 
The jury awarded $2,787.50 in "Economic damages," and $15,000.00 in "Non-economic 
damages." Only nine members signed the verdict form. (R., p. 255.) 
Mrs. Kafader then timely filed a motion for additur and in the alternative for a new trial. 
The trial court denied the motion and entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Additur and in the Alternative for a New Trial. (R., p. 332-345.) 
(iii) A concise statement of the facts. 
A. Judge Stoker did not independently weight the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. 
Although this case involved a battIe of expert witnesses, Judge Stoker states he did not 
independently weigh the credibility of any of the experts when considering Mrs. Kafader's 
motion for new trial. "The credibility of the doctors' opinions is truly a matter for jury 
determination." (R., p. 339.) 
Judge Stoker premised his conclusions on what he assumed the jury believed, not on his 
own independent evaluation of the evidence and witnesses. "The Court has weighed the 
evidence in this case and concludes under the above analysis that the verdict was not so disparate 
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with a reasonable view of the evidence as to suggest an award under the' influence of passion or 
prejudice.' An award of$15,000.00 general damages under the facts of this case is consistent 
with a verdict that this C0U11 sitting without a jury would have awarded, given the jinding that 
the cervical injury was not permanent." CR., p. 340.) (Emphasis added.) 
Judge Stoker assumed the jury did not find a permanent injury based on the amount of 
general damages ($15,000.00) awarded. "If the Court believed that this jury had concluded that 
Plaintiffs cervical injury was permanent then the Court would agree with Plaintiff that the award 
in this case was woefully inadequate." (R., p. 338.) (Emphasis added.) 
B. Mrs. Kafader proved she sustained a permanent cervical injury. 
The Defendant testified she was traveling 10-15 miles per hour when she crashed into the 
back of Mrs. Kafader's pickup truck. (Tr., p. 89, L. 10-13.) 
Dr. Richard Hammond is a licensed medical doctor who specializes in neurology. Dr. 
Hammond had been treating Mrs. Kafader since April 2009 and had seen her 13 times over two 
years before the trial in July 2011. Dr. Hammond testified he had treated patients who reported 
being hit from behind in a collision "A couple hundred probably .... " during his 20 years in 
practice. (Tr., p. 147, L. 16, to p. 150, L. 17.) Dr. Hammond's ChaI1 notes were admitted as 
Exhibit 1. 
Dr. Brad Turner is a licensed chiropractor and has practiced in Twin Falls for 20 years. 
(Tr., p. 92, L. 6, to p. 94, L. 18.) Dr. Turner's chart notes were admitted as Exhibit 2. 
Mrs. Kafader had a significant medical history, including three lumbar-area back 
surgeries that predated the collision in October 2008. Mrs. Kafader also broke her ankle in the 
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Twin Falls Winco parking lot in early 2008, and had several surgeries both before and after 
October 2008. Notwithstanding this medical history, however, Dr. Turner testified that he did 
not believe Mrs. Kafader had any "chronic neck injury" prior to October 2008. (Tr., p. 136, L. 
17, to p. 137, L. 3.) 
Dr. Turner had been treating Mrs. Kafader for pain associated with her back surgeries and 
ankle surgeries since 2006, but testified although he had treated Mrs. Kafader for neck pain 
previously on a few occasions over several years, he had never treated Mrs. Kafader for an acute 
cervical injury before seeing Mrs. Kafader following the October 2008 collision. (Tr., p 103, L. 
1, to p. 104, L. 23.) 
Mrs. Kafader's cervical injury was consistent with the types of injuries Dr. Turner had 
observed, diagnosed and treated for 20 years in patients who had been involved in rear-end 
collisions. (Tr., p. 94, L. 11, to p. 95, L. 20, and p. 105, L. 2, to p. 106, L. 23.) 
Dr. Turner testified that when he examined Mrs. Kafader on May 19, 2011, just before 
the trial, the results of that examination were similar to the results of Dr. Turner's examination in 
October 2008. Dr. Turner then opined that based upon his clinical observation of Mrs. Kafader 
from October 2008 until May 2011 and in consideration of his objective findings confirming 
Mrs. Kafader's subjective complaints, Mrs. Kafader had suffered a permanent cervical injury. 
(Tr., p. 111, L. 13, to p. 113, L. 4.) 
Dr. Hammond confirmed his objective findings of cervical inj ury in April 2009 were 
similar to his objective finding of cervical injury just prior to the trial in July 2011 after 
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observing Mrs. Kafader during 13 appointments covering nearly two and a half years. (Tr., p 
158, L. 24 to p. 159, L. 5.) 
Dr. Hammond considered and ruled out that fibromyalgia was any factor causing Mrs. 
Kafader's cervical pain. (Tr., p. 160, L. 7 to p. 161, L. 23, and p. 188, L. 19 to p. 189, L. 10.) 
(Exhibit 1, p. 23.L 
During cross-examination Defendant's counsel asked Dr. Hammond why "fibromyalgia" 
is listed in his medical records, (Exhibit 1, p. 30-31.), as a "current problem." Dr. Hammond 
responded by clarifying the "list" in his medical records is generated by the St. Luke's document 
system, not Dr. Hammond, so any treating physician can input the information. Dr. Hammond 
confirmed that simply because something is listed, it does not mean the diagnosis is "active." 
(Tr., p 187, L. 11-19.) 
Dr. Hammond testified both he and Dr. Turner noted and documented spasms in Mrs. 
Kafader's cervical region well before and long after Dr. Knoebel's examination. Dr. Hammond 
testified he believed it was "medically impossible" for Mrs. Kafader not to have displayed 
cervical spasms during Dr. Knoebel's examination-directly attacking Dr. Knoebel's claim he did 
not observe any objective findings. I 
Tr., p. 295. [Dr. Hammond's rebuttal testimony] 
6 Q. And ifI understand your testimony and 
7 Dr. Turner's testimony the other day, you both had 
8 noted objective findings before and after Dr. Knoebel's 
J Judge Stoker appears to have misunderstood Dr. Hammond as the Judge states in his opinion, 
"Significantly, Dr. Hammond testified that it was a "medical impossibility" for the plaintiff to display 
involuntary spasms in her neck area" (R., p. 334.) Dr. Hammond was not agreeing with Dr. Knoebel's 
findings but directly refuting them as is evident in Dr. Hammond's actual testimony. 
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9 evaluation, is that correct? 
10 A. That's correct. 
11 Q. Now is there, is there an explanation, a medical 
12 explanation in your mind that would, that could 
13 establish that at a point prior to she had objective 
14 findings, at a point prior after a point there were 
15 objective findings, but at a certain time in April of 
16 '11, for example, that she could not have any objective 
17 findings in the cervical and lumbar area? 
18 A. Can I make reference to Dr. Knoebel's medical 
19 exam? 
20 Q. Absolutely. 
21 A. Do I have to make that a --
22 Q. Nope. 
23 A. Okay. So I have Dr. Knoebel's April 14th, 2011, 
24 medical exam of Mrs. Kafader. And I've reviewed this 
25 multiple times and at no time does he ever actually 
P.296. 
1 make a comment concerning the muscle spasm in her 
2 neck. He never once mentions spasm, any type of tone, 
3 or any other term you wish to use about the quality of 
4 her neck muscles. He says that they are tender, but 
5 that's a subjective complaint. He does not make a 
6 single reference to the objective findings of her neck 
7 muscles in his entire report. 
8 Q. Does he report anywhere other than that he 
9 actually did a palpation or physical examination of her 
10 cervical area? 
11 A. Yes. He references that he touches her neck 
12 muscles and that she is tender and makes grimacing 
13 faces, but he does not once record the tone that he 
14 feels when he palpates her. 
15 Q. Okay. Are you saying that you believe it is 
16 medically impossible for her not to have had objective 
17 symptomology during that exam? 
18 A. Correct. There is three of us that have 
19 documented spasm, marked spasm of her neck muscles: 
20 myself, Dr. Turner and the physical therapist Julie 
2 i Schwerman. 
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Three treating medical care providers observed spasms in Mrs. Kafader's cervical spine 
region consistently over more than a two-year period and only Dr. Knoebel, during his half-hour 
exam claimed he did not. 
Dr. Hammond also testified he specifically disputed Dr. Knoebel's claim Mrs. Kafader's 
pain was caused by fibromyalgia. (Tr., p. 300, L. 12, to p. 301, L. 6.) 
While Dr. Knoebel claims the drug Sevella is for treating fibromyalgia, Dr. Hammond 
testified he prescribes this drug for other symptoms, including pain. (Tr., p. 302, L. 24, to p. 303, 
L. 19.) 
Dr. Hammond researched the Quebec "Whiplash" study that Dr. Knoebel identified 
during his deposition, but which the Doctor had not previously identified in his Defense Medical 
Examination. During his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Hammond testified he was critical of the "very 
odd study," and noted the data in the report contradicted the ultimate conclusions that most 
cervical injuries resulting from a rear-end impact should resolve in eight weeks or less. Dr. 
Hammond also identified the authors were very selective in their sources and subjects, which 
further undermined the credibility of the study. Dr. Hammond concluded not only was the 
"study" flawed in many ways, he believed Dr. Knoebel misapplied the study's findings to his 
analysis of Mrs. Kafader's case. (Tr., p. 305, L. 7, to p. 309, L. 16.) 
Dr. Hammond did agree with Dr. Knoebel's opinion the collision caused a "cervical 
injury," and exacerbated an existing lumbar injury. (Tr., p. 294, L. 10-16.) 
Mrs. Kafader claimed special damages totaling $15,475.72. (Exhibit 4). 
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C. Dr. Knoebel, the Defendant's medical expert, was not credible. 
Dr. Richard Knoebel is a licensed orthopedic surgeon, who has not performed surgery 
since 1996. (Supp. Tr., p. 5, L. 9-10, and p. 19, L. 2-3.) 
Dr. Knoebel's primary business involves performing medical evaluations; 20% of which 
he claims are related to personally injury litigation, not actively practicing medicine. (Supp. Tr., 
p. 7, L. 1-7.) Of the medical evaluations Dr. Knoebel performs related to personal injury 
litigation, Dr. Knoebel conducts "over 99 percent" for defendants. (Supp. Tr., p. 17, L. 16-23.) 
Dr. Knoebel evaluated Mrs. Kafader in April 2011, which took "about an hour" and 
which consisted of"30 minutes of history taking and a then an examination .... " (Supp. Tr. p. 20, 
L. 14-15.) 
Dr. Knoebel testified his opinions were based on, "My medical experience, my 
examination of the claimant, my evaluation of her past medical records and my review of the 
medical literature." (Supp. Tr., p. 15, L. 23 to p. 16, L. 2.) 
Dr. Knoebel conceded that he had not reviewed any medical records from Dr. Hammond 
as of the date of his deposition on July 13,2011, a week before the trial. (Supp. Tr., p. 20, L. 24, 
to p. 21, L. 2, and p. 33, L. 9-12.) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 consists of 3 5 pages of Dr. Hammond's chart notes beginning April 
24,2009 and ending July 13,2012. During Dr. Knoebel's deposition, he reviewed Dr. 
Hammond's entire file in less than 2 minutes. (Supp. Tr., p. 39, L. 6-22.) 
Dr. Knoebel asserted he had reviewed medical records from Dr. Pica, a rheumatologist, 
who Dr. Knoebel claimed had diagnosed and treated Mrs. Kafader for fibromyalgia. (Supp.Ir., 
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p. 31, L. 18-24.) However, Dr. Knoebel ultimately admitted that he had not reviewed any 
records from Dr. Pica, (who had been retired for at least 5 years), but was referring to a single 
chart note entered by Mrs. Kafader's family physician Dr. Dobson in which Dr. Knoebel claimed 
Dr. Dobson stated Dr. Pica had made such diagnosis. (Supp. Tr., p. 32, L. 9-25.) 
The Defendant failed to present a single chart note from any physician corroborating Dr. 
Knoebel's claim of Mrs. Kafader's continuing treatment for fibromyalgia at any time after Dr. 
Pica's alleged diagnosis five years prior to the collision. 
Dr. Knoebel testified he was relying on the "Quebec whiplash study," to support his 
opinion Mrs. Kafader's cervical injury was not permanent and should have resolved in eight 
weeks, although he did not refer to that study in his Defense Medical Exan1ination report. (Supp. 
Tr., p. 26, L. 19.) 
Dr. Knoebel charges $500.00 per hour to review medical records, $1,300.00 per each 
medical evaluation and he does "12-18" per week for "maybe 42" weeks per year. (Supp. Tr., p. 
37, L. 9-24.) (Assuming only 1 hour to review medical records per exam, assuming an average 
of 15 exams per week, and assuming Dr. Knoebel's statement he only works 42 weeks per year 
is accurate, his gross income is over 1.1 million dollars.) 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 consists of35 pages of Dr. Hammond's chart notes beginning April 
24,2009 and ending July 13,2012. During Dr. Knoebel's deposition, he reviewed Dr. 
Hammond's entire file in less than 2 minutes. (Supp. Tr., p. 39, L. 6-22.) 
Dr. Knoebel repeatedly claimed that no doctor has documented any "physical exam 
findings" confirming Mrs. Kafader's cervical injuries, yet both Drs. Hammond and Turner 
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extensively documented their objective findings of Mrs. Kafader's subjective cervical-area pain 
complaints for over two years before the trial. Dr. Knoebel's statement is refuted on literally 
every page of Exhibits 1 and 2. 
Dr. Knoebel denied he created any documents other than his written Defense Medical 
Examination. However, when pressed, Dr. Knoebel confirmed he uses some type of "checklist" 
when conducting his evaluations, but Dr. Knoebel claimed he "destroyed" the checklist he used 
during Mrs. Kafader's evaluation. When asked for a blank copy of the checklist, Dr. Knoebel 
claimed he did not know "which checklist" he had used during the April 2011 evaluation he 
conducted just 3 months prior to his deposition and refused to provide any documents. (Supp. 
Tr. p., 38, L. 10-23.) 
Dr. Knoebel testified Mrs. Kafader's lumbar and cervical injuries should have resolved in 
eight weeks or less. (Supp. Tr., p. 15, L. 5-19.) 
Issues Presented on Appeal. 
Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it denied the Appellant's Motion 
for Additur or in the Alternative New Trial? 
Whether the Appellant is entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
Argument. 
Mrs. Kafader argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to 
consider and weigh all of the evidence while considering Mrs. Kafader's motions for additur and 
new trial. Consequently, she seeks an order remanding the case to the district court with 
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directions for Judge Stoker to independently evaluate the credibility of the medical expert 
witnesses when deciding the pending motions. 
Mrs. Kafader also argues in the alternative the appellate court should order on remand 
that the district court enter an order granting her motion for additur and for new trial based on the 
record presented on appeal. 
I. STANDARD FOR NEW TRIAL 
Following the trial, Mrs. Kafader timely filed a Motion for Additur and in the Alternative 
for a New Trial and sought relief according to Rules 59(a)(5) and (6), IRCP. (R., p. 267-8.) 
When considering a motion brought under Rule 59(a) sections 5 and 6, the Court applies two 
similar, yet distinct standards. 
"There is a qualitative difference between a trial judge's role in deciding whether 
a new trial is justified based on the insufficiency of the evidence under Rule 
59(a)(6), and whether a new trial is justified based on the amount of the jury's 
award of damages under Rule 59(a)(5)." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 
P .2d 1187, 1196 (1986). As mentioned above, a new trial can be granted under 
Rule 59(a)(5) on the ground of "inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice." A new trial can be granted 
under Rule 59(a)(6) based upon the "[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict." The trial court's analysis under the two rules is different. Under Rule 
59(a)(5), the trial court "must weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's 
award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the disparity is so 
great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand." Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 625, 
603 P.2d at 580 (emphasis in original). Under Rule 59(a)(6), the trial judge must 
"weigh the evidence and determine (1) whether the verdict is against his or her 
view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would 
produce a different result." Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho 
Transportation Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 833, 136 P.3d 297, 304 (2006) . 
Harger v. Teton Springs Golfand Castings, 145 Idaho 716, 718-19,184 P.3d 841,843-
44 (2008). 
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Under either standard, however, the trial court must conduct its own independent 
evaluation of all the evidence. If the trial court refuses to conduct an independent evaluation of 
all of the evidence, including the credibility of the expert witnesses, then the trial court has not 
acted "consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it," the 
second prong of the abuse of discretions standard. Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho 787, 25 P.3d 
100, 102 (2001). Any resulting decision therefore is a patent abuse of discretion. 
When reviewing an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial, the reviewing court 
is relying on the trial court's independent evaluation of the evidence. 
The trial court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility and 
testimony of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence. Appellate 
review is necessarily more limited. While we must review the evidence, we are 
not in a position to "weigh" it as the trial court can. 
Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797,801, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006). 
It is hard to imagine any meaningful review on appeal if the trial court fails to "weigh the 
demeanor, credibility and testimony of the witnesses" and state its opinions when deciding 
whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial. The Supreme Court recently in Carrillo v. Boise 
Tire Co., Supreme Court Doc. No 37026 ( 2012), agreed as it stated, "[t ]hus, to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must assess whether it properly examined the 
relationship between its own findings of fact and the jury verdict through the unique lenses of 
Rule 59(a)(5) and 59(a)(6). Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., at p. 7. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT 
EVALUATION OF THE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE WHEN CONSIDERING MRS. 
KAFADER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND THEREFORE ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION 
This case involved the credibility of three expert witnesses; two treating physicians who 
had personally observed and treated Mrs. Kafader for two and a half years, and who had 
concluded based on their respective medical educations and experiences that Mrs. Kafader had 
sustained a permanent and painful cervical injury, versus a highly-paid defense medical 
evaluator, who admittedly had not reviewed critical medical records, who refused to provide 
relevant notes from his 30-minute medical examination, whose opinion was based on a highly 
criticized and doubtful Quebec "whiplash" study, and whose claim he did not observe any 
"objective" symptoms during his 30-minute exam was a "medical impossibility." 
Considering the pivotal issue in this case was whether or not Mrs. Kafader proved she 
sustained a permanent cervical injury, the trial court was required to state its independent 
evaluation of the medical expert witnesses, not defer to the jury's assumed conclusions, when 
considering a motion for new trial. Judge Stoker, however, stated he was not considering or 
weighing the credibility of the experts. "The credibility of the doctors' opinions is truly a matter 
for jury determination." CR., p. 338.) 
Contrary to Judge Stoker's belief he lacked authority to weigh the credibility of the 
expert witnesses, in Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho 787,25 P.3d 100 (2001), a medical 
malpractice case, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant of a new trial under Rule 
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59(a)(6), IRCP, and ruled that it was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion to discount 
or disregard medical expert testimony, even when that medical evidence was contradicted. 
The district judge clearly understood his role in weighing the evidence, 
however, Dr. lambura argues the district judge exceeded the bounds of his 
discretion by discounting the expert testimony offered by the defendants. 
Specifically, Dr. lambura argues the district judge abused his discretion by 
"refusing to weight" or "disregarding" the expert testimony of Drs. Latchaw, 
Vlcek, Glass and Molteni. This Court has long recognized that the trial judge, 
sitting at the heart of the trial process, is in a position that those on the appellate 
level cannot duplicate. Robertson, 115 Idaho at 631, 769 P.2d at 508. The "trial 
court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and 
testimony of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence." Burggraf, 
121 Idaho at 173,823 P.2d at 777 (citing Quick, 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 
1198). Because of the trial judge's unique position of having heard all of the 
testimony and examined all of the evidence, their weighing of the evidence in a 
motion for new trial is given considerable discretion. Quick, 111 Idaho at 767, 
727 P.2d at 1198. See also, Robertson, 115 Idaho at 631,769 P.2d at 508. The 
district judge's determination to discount the testimony of the defendant's 
expert witnesses; therefore, was a proper exercise of his discretion in 
weighing the demeanor, credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence. 
Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho 787,790, 25 P.3d 100, 103 (2001) (Emphasis added). 
The Jambura Court, after noting the opinion below confirmed the trial judge had questioned 
the veracity of the proffered defense medical expert's testimony when granting the motion for new 
trial, and affirmed the judge's disregard of the testimony, even when it appeared the jury had found 
the medical expert testimony credible. "Again, the district judge's critical assessment of the experts 
in this case was a proper exercise of his discretion to independently weight the demeanor, credibility 
and testimony of witnesses." Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho at 790. (Emphasis added.) 
The Jambura Court understood, rather than deferring to the jury where medical expert 
testimony is concerned, it is this "expert" testimony that requires the trial court's heightened 
scrutiny. The reality, as the Supreme Court must have concluded, ifajury is going to be unduly 
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influenced or misled, it is likely to be through testimony by slick and polished professional 
expert witnesses like Dr. Knoebel, as apparently happened in the lambura case, and obviously 
occurred here. Dr. Knoebel is not a doctor in the general sense, but a highly-paid expert witness. 
Consequently, his testimony should be accorded the appropriate weight for testimony that is 
bought and paid for, not the product of a fair analysis of the facts. The trial judge in lambura 
determined, and the Supreme Court agreed, while it is important to recognize the function of the 
jury, justice is hardly served when trial courts ignore obviously biased and suspect expert 
testimony. 
Drs. Hammond and Turner testified Mrs. Kafader's cervical injury was permanent; Dr. 
Knoebel testified the injury was minimal and should have resolved in 8 weeks-absolutely 
divergent opinions. Judge Stoker clearly identified he understood this issue; whether Mrs. 
Kafader's injury was permanent, as throughout the Court's decision, he refers to what the jury 
may have concluded about the permanency of Mrs. Kafader's injury. However, Mrs. Kafader is 
entitled when moving for an additur or new trial to have the trial court weigh the "demeanor, 
credibility or persuasiveness" of the experts or their testimony, not to have the trial court assume 
what the jury might have concluded. Did Judge Stoker believe Dr. Knoebel's testimony was 
credible or was entitled to the same weight as that of Dr. Hammond or Dr. Turner? Undoubtedly, 
the trial court had a duty to make such a finding, under either a Rule 59(a)(5) or (6) analysis, not 
simply defer to the jury. 
Assuming as Judge Stoker did the $15,000.00 award for general damages indicated the 
jury did not believe Mrs. Kafader suffered a permanent injury, then to have satisfied the 
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standards applicable when considering a motion for new trial, Judge Stoker had to conclude such 
a finding was consistent with what evidence he considered credible based on his own 
independent evaluation of Dr. Knoebel's testimony. If Judge Stoker did not consider Dr. 
Knoebel credible, or give his testimony the weight it accorded Mrs. Kafader's unbiased treating 
physicians; Dr. Hammond and Dr. Turner, then Judge Stoker should have done just as the trial 
court did in the Jambura case and disregarded Dr. Knoebel's testimony. 
Had Judge Stoker considered the credibility of the expert witnesses, undoubtedly, he 
should have weighed the following factors. First, while Dr. Knoebel claimed that any cervical 
pain Mrs. Kafader was experiencing after eight weeks was from her alleged preexisting 
fibromyalgia, and despite his claim that Mrs. Kafader's fibromyalgia treatment was ongoing, 
remarkably, the Defendant failed to provide a single medical record that established or 
corroborated either an accurate diagnosis of fibromyalgia or any ongoing treatment for this 
"syndrome" at any point relative to the 2008 collision as Dr. Knoebel claimed. Conversely, Dr. 
Hammond considered and ruled out fibromyalgia as a cause of Mrs. Kafader's pain based on his 
documented observation of objective spasms in Mrs. Kafader's neck over a two year period, the 
same objective spasms that Dr. Turner confirmed. Based on these facts, it is hard to imagine Dr. 
Knoebel's opinion that Mrs. Kafader's pain was the result ofthe amorphous syndrome 
fibromyalgia which Dr. Knoebel defined "[as] a syndrome, meaning that it is a bunch of 
subjective complaints without any hard objective findings," (Supp. Tr., p. 35, L. 6-8.) 
(Emphasis added.), was in any maimer credible. Mrs. Kafader presented proof of "hard objective 
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findings" by two treating physicians for more than two years, which obviously ruled out 
fibromyalgia. 
Judge Stoker should also have considered when weighing Dr. Turner's and Dr. 
Hammond's testimony that Dr. Turner had treated Mrs. Kafader both before and after the 
collision in 2008, and Dr. Turner's opinions at trial were supported by his personal observations 
over many years and during each documented appointment in Dr. Turner's medical records, 
(Exhibit 2.); and that Dr. Hammond's opinion was founded on his personal observations made 
during thirteen office visits over more than a two year period; versus Dr. Knoebel's one-time 
30-minute examination. Who was likely to have misdiagnosed the injury; Drs. Hammond and 
Turner during their treatment over two and a half years, or Dr. Knoebel after his 30-minute 
examination? 
What about Dr. Hammond's opinion, based on his 20-year experience practicing 
neurology, it was "medically impossible" for Mrs. Kafader to have presented at Dr. Knoebel's 
Defense Medical Examination without objective findings of spasms in her cervical spine area; 
the same objective findings that both Dr. Hammond and Dr. Turner observed and documented 
both before and after Dr. Knoebel's examination, versus that of Dr. Knoebel, who claimed he did 
not see any spasms whatsoever? What weight should Judge Stoker have given Dr. Knoebel's 
testimony considering Dr. Knoebel's observation was based on a 30-minute evaluation and Drs. 
Hammond and Turner had documented objective findings for over two years, both before and 
after Dr. Knoebel's exam? 
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If Dr. Knoebel truly wanted to provide an accurate diagnosis, then perhaps he should 
have reviewed all relevant medical records, and then conducted more than a "2 minute" cursory 
review of Dr. Hammond's medical records, considering Dr. Hammond had treated Mrs. Kafader 
for over two years. What weight should have Judge Stoker given Dr. Knoebel's opinion when it 
was undisputed Dr. Knoebel had not reviewed all relevant medical records before rendering his 
opinions? 
Was Dr. Knoebel's testimony entitled to any credibility after he testified he reviewed 
medical records when he had not, or when he purposefully destroyed his evaluation "checklist" 
and refused to produce even a blank copy of that document? 
Judge Stoker should also have considered the fact that Dr. Hammond is a neurologist, 
that Mrs. Kafader's injury was a neurological injury, and that Dr. Knoebel is not a neurologist. 
As Dr. Hammond's opinions were based on his diagnosis of an injury related to his particular 
medical specialty, it would seem his opinion should be entitled to more weight than a doctor who 
did not have a similar medical specialty? 
Additionally, when considering Dr. Knoebel's veracity and credibility, Judge Stoker 
should have considered whether Dr. Knoebel's opinions were based on his desire to accurately 
diagnose (assuming then he would want to consider all relevant medical records) or on his desire 
to maintain a lucrative business testifying for defendants? It appears prudent to acknowledge the 
obvious-that it would be bad for Dr. Knoebel's business ifhe were to start agreeing with treating 
physicians when considering what weight to afford Dr. Knoebel's testimony? 
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Finally, Judge Stoker should have considered Dr. Knoebel's reliance on the Quebec 
"whiplash" study in light of Dr. Hammond's rebuttal testimony in which Dr. Hammond 
identified the fallacies of the study and its rejection by competent medical authority. Dr. 
Knoebel claimed Mrs. Kafader should have fully recovered in eight weeks or less based on a 
study the results of which have been rejected by the medical community. What weight should 
the court have given Dr. Knoebel's opinion under these circumstances? 
The Rule 59(a)(5) analysis requires the trial court to make an independent evaluation of 
all the evidence and determine what the Court would have awarded. Based on these factors, it is 
hard to imagine had Judge Stoker weighed the testimony and credibility of Drs. Hammond and 
Turner with that of Dr. Knoebel, Judge Stoker would have had any reasoned basis to find Mrs. 
Kafader had not proven a permanent cervical injury. If the only credible medical evidence 
established Mrs. Kafader sustained a permanent cervical injury, which as Judge Stoker conceded 
would warrant "a much greater award than $15,000 for past and future damages[,] (R., p. 338.), 
then there should have been a substantial disparity between the court's award and $15,000.00 the 
jury awarded. 
Rule 59(a)(6) also requires the trial court to weigh all of the evidence. If Judge Stoker, 
after having weighed the credibility of the experts, found that Mrs. Kafader had proved she 
sustained a permanent cervical injury, then the verdict would be against "the clear weight of the 
evidence." 
While a "trial court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and 
testimony of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence," on this appeal the reviewing 
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court is without the lUxury of Judge Stoker's opinions or observations regarding the expert 
testimony. 
III. THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
A NEW TRIAL WOULD PRODUCE A DIFFERENT RESULT 
"A grant of new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) is appropriate if the court determines that 
the evidence is insufficient to justifY the jury's verdict. The trial court must "determine (1) 
whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether 
a new trial would produce a different result'." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Doc. No 37026, p. 9, 
(2012), citing Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 826,833,136 P.3d 
297,304 (2006). 
Judge Stoker assumed the jury concluded Mrs. Kafader had not sustained a permanent 
injury based on the amount of general damages ($15,000.00) it awarded. As both Dr. Hammond 
and Dr. Turner testified that in their professional opinions Mrs. Kafader's cervical injury was 
permanent, and Dr. Knoebel stated otherwise, then one logical conclusion nine members of the 
the jury believed Dr. Knoebel and completely disregarded any other testimony. The other 
conclusion is the jury believed Drs. Hammond and Turner, but concluded $15,000.00 was 
adequate compensation for Mrs. Kafader's permanent injury. 
As noted above, Mrs. Kafader proved her permanent cervical injury with the testimony of 
her two disinterested treating physicians based on their personal observations and documented 
objective findings for over two years. Contrast that compelling evidence with the testimony of 
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highly-paid Dr. Knoebel who conducted a single 30-minute exam2 and claimed he was basing his 
opinions on medical records which he had not reviewed or that did not exist. Dr. Knoebel 
claimed Mrs. Kafader was suffering from fibromyalgia based on a diagnosis allegedly made five 
years before the October 2008 collision, but which was not supported by a single subsequent 
medical record offered as evidence at trial. Assuming for the sake of argument that Dr. Pica had 
properly diagnosed fibromyalgia five years earlier, there was no record of any diagnosis or 
treatment subsequent to that time. Nor was there any evidence presented, again even if Mrs. 
Kafader had the syndrome, it ever affected her neck. The reality, Dr. Knoebel's testimony, 
assuming the jury somehow believed his baseless opinions, when compared with the compelling 
evidence to the contrary, is entitled to very little if any weight. 
If the trial or reviewing court were to find the verdict is "not in accord with his [their] 
assessment of the clear weight of the evidence," then the rational conclusion is some force, other 
than the logical and reasoned interpretation of the evidence caused the particular result. It seems 
hard to imagine a situation where a district court having just found the verdict was against the 
clear weight of the evidence; essentially stating the verdict was an anomaly, then not finding a 
"retrial would produce a different result." Implicit in a ruling "the verdict is not in accord with 
his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence," is a new trial is warranted and a different 
result is likely. 
2 Dr. Hammond testified that Dr. Knoebel did not reference any objective findings of Mrs. Kafader's 
neck muscles in his DME report. (Tr., p. 295, L. 18, to p. 296, L. 14.) 
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While it is not apparent just what motivated nine members of the jury to rule as they did, 
it is obvious that decision is not supported by the clear weight of the evidence that established 
Mrs. Kafader suffered a permanent cervical injury. Mrs. Kafader therefore respectfully requests 
the appellate court order remand with direction for the district court to grant Ms. Kafader's 
motion for new trial. 
VI. THE DAMAGES A WARDED WERE INADEQUATE AND THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION FOR ADDITUR 
As the great weight of the evidence established Mrs. Kafader suffered a permanent 
cervical injury, the resulting verdict of$15,000.00 for pain and suffering for the remainder of 
Mrs. Kafader's life (26 years) is inadequate. 
Even Judge Stoker acknowledged the verdict was inadequate in his opinion if Mrs. 
Kafader's injury was permanent. "If the Court believed that this jury had concluded that 
Plaintiffs cervical injury was permanent then the Court would agree with Plaintiff that the award 
in this case was woefully inadequate." (R., p. 338.) (Emphasis added.) 
If on appeal the appellate court determines a finding that Mrs. Kafader had not proved a 
permanent cervical injury is against the great weight of the evidence, then Mrs. Kafader 
respectfully requests the Court order the District Court on remand to grant her motion for 
additur. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES 
Mrs. Kafader seeks attorney fees on appeal according to Idaho Code § 12-121. "Attorney 
fees under § 12-121 will be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal when this Coun is left with 
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the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation." Adler v. Abolafia, Supreme Court Doc. No.3 8189 (2010), p. 10, quoting 
Rudd v. A1erritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230,237 (2003). Based on the clear standards 
applicable when considering a motion for new trial that require the trial court to perform an 
independent evaluation of the evidence, and as the record is clear that the trial court did not 
follow the requisite legal standards, any defense would appear to be frivolous, unreasonable and 
without foundation. 
Conclusion. 
Mrs. Kafader respectfully requests that the appellate court remand this case to the district 
court with direction the district court conduct its own evaluation of the evidence and weigh the 
credibility of the medical expert witnesses when deciding Mrs. Kafader's Motion for Additur and 
in the Alternative New Trial. In the alternative, Mrs. Kafader asks the appellate court to remand 
the case with direction to the district court to grant Mrs. Kafader's motion for Additur or new 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2012. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of April, 2012, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via hand delivery to: 
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LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
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